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81 STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff claiming 
· IO: a right-of-way through the land of the defendant, which 
claim is based on a public dedication by use or a private 
right-of-way acquired by prescriptive use and pursuant 
' to the laws of the State of Utah. The Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Morgan County in a hearing 
which took place on the 14th day of December, 1970, 
the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, presiding, in a 
memorandum decision and judgment ruled that the 
plaintiff had failed to establish that the road in question 
had been dedicated by public use and the Court ignored 
I 
and failed to rule on the other questions raised and aJ. 
leged by the plaintiff-appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial 
court's decision as to the one issue decided by the Court 
and that in any event the case be remanded to the lower 
court with instructions to grant the relief prayed for 
in the complaint on any one of the grounds alleged in 
said complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dry Hollow Road is located in Morgan County,, 
Utah. It runs in a general easterly direction through 
property owned by defendant-respondent (hereinafter! 
designated as "respondent"), and thereafter through: 
property belonging to plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter I 
designated as "appellant"). (T: 4.5, Exhs. A. B. 17).' 
Among other things, it has been used to maintain a spring, 
in the East Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 3), 
Township 5 North, Range 2 East of the Salt Lake Meri· 
dian, and for access for use of irrigation waters arising• 
in what is known as Dry Creek. The water right of ap·. 
pellant's predecessor in interest to use the waters of Dry• 
Creek, as well as the excess water of the aforementioned 
spring, dates back to the year 1866. (T: 25, 35, Exh. C 
(page 28, rt. # 189). 
Mr. John L. Young, now 75 years of age, remem· · 
bers Dry Hollow Road as being in existence since the 
2 
time he was 10 years old, or a period of 65 years. He 
considered it a public road in use by deer hunters "and 
that" made it such. "There was always travel up that 
way." (Sheepmen and deer hunters.) There was no re-
striction on this activity "until later years." For a per-
iod of 50 or 60 years "there was nobody stopped them 
from going there." (T: 75, 76, 77, 78). 
On the 9th day of February, 1917, respondent's 
predecessors in interest entered into a "Water Deed and 
Agreement" with the "Board of Education of Morgan 
County, Utah," under the terms of which respondent's 
predecessors in interest conveyed and warranted to the 
School Board "all their right, title and interest in and 
to the water" of the above mentioned spring. In addi-
tion to the grant of water, the "Water Deed and Agree-
ment" recites as follows: 
"also a perpetual right-of-way and easement one 
rod in width over and across the lands owned 
by said parties of the second part hereinbefore 
mentioned, for the purpose of laying a pipe line 
and maintaining the same to convey the waters 
of said spring, and for ingress and egress to the 
said party of the first part, agents, employees, 
and contractors for the purpose of laying said 
pipe line and making repairs, inspection, mainte-
nance, and improvement of the same, the said 
use to be at as little damage as possible to the 
said parties of the second part, the said right of 
way and easement to be in a westerly direction 
from said spring and along the course of stakes 
heretofore staked and laid out by Bostaph and 
Roach, engineers, one half of said right of way 
and easement to be on each side of said pipelines 
3 
as finally laid, and the parties of the second par1 
agree to execute a Deed for same containing a 
particular description thereof to be as furnishea 
by the said Bosteph and Roach." 
In consideration of said conveyance, the Board ol 
Education granted the respondent's predecessors in in· 
terest two connections to the pipe line. (Exh. 1). 
In the year 1920, the School Board constructed a 
roadway along the right-of-way conveyed to it by re· 
spondent's predecessors in interest. (T: 8). In 1937, the 
School Board, by warranty deed, conveyed its water 
rights in the above mentioned spring, and all appurte· 
nances, to the Peterson Corporation of the Church ol 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. This warranty deea 
contains the following language: 
"To be transferred under the following con&! 
tions: that the property described herein be per· 
manently maintained intact and used for public 
benefit and to remain nontransferrable in part or 
whole to private enterprise and that a reasonable 
effort be made by the grantee to maintain and 
use the property for the best interest of the com· 
munity." (T: 11, 12, Exh. 2). 
I 
Dry Hollow Road has been used by deer hunters,' 
tree cutters, irrigators, fence builders, farmers, neckers, 
sheepmen, and the general public from before 1900 until 
1964 without restriction. (T: 25, 34, 35, 39, 40, 54, 57, 
61, 63, 67, 69, 76, 77, 78, 79, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 113). 
In 1961, at the time the freeway was under construction, 
the State of Utah fenced off the property line where Dry' 
4 
Hollow Road begins and proceeds across respondent's 
land. The gates in this fence were installed by the State 
Highway Department. (T: 6). 
Until 1953, there was no lock on Dry Hollow Road 
entrance to respondent's land from the public road. In 
1953, respondent put a lock on the gate leading into ap-
pellant's land, and the lock was there for 4 years. How-
ever, appellant's predecessors in interest had a key to 
the lock. (T: 123, 128, 129). 
One person paid respondent's predecessor in inter-
est $20.00 for taking his sheep up the roadway, but this 
was for damage the sheep did to the surrounding pasture, 
and not for the use of the road. (T: 91, 93). 
In July of 1964, respondent paid the School Board 
i· ! the sum of $10.00 for a Quit Claim Deed to the property 
the School Board had previously conveyed by warranty 
deed (in 193 7) to the Peterson Corporation of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and which contained 
the above cited recitations. Thereafter, respondent re-
fused to permit appellant and appellant's predecessors in 






STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Legislature reenacted Section 27-1-2, now Sec-
tion 27-12-89, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, as 
amended, which states as follows: 
"Public use constituting dedication - A high-
way shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
5 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has 
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare 
for a period of ten years." 
One of the basic issues before the Court in this case 
is the application of this statute to the facts as shown in 
the record and as this statute has been interpreted by 
this Court in other cases heretofore decided involving 
an interpretation of this statute. 
There is evidence in the record that there was, in , 
fact, a public dedication of the highway in question and: 
that the provisions of Section 27-1-3, UTAH CODE AN. 
NOTATED, 1953, as amended, should have been con· 1 
sidered and applied by the lower court. I 
I 
The court below made no decision as to whether or I 
not the plaintiff-appellant had acquired a prescriptive: 
right to the use of the defendant-respondent's thorough·: 
fare in question. 
I 
The court below made no reference or mention to [ 
the provisions of Section 73-1-15, UTAH CODE AN· I 
NOTATED, as amended, which allows the plaintiff· 
1 
respondent a right-of-way through the land of the de· ' 
fendant-respondent to maintain her water right, which 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DRY 
HOLLOW ROAD IS NOT A PUBLIC ROAD BECAUSE THE 
EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES (A) THAT DRY HOL-
LOW ROAD HAS BEEN USED BY THE PUBLIC FOR OVER 
SIXTY YEARS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND IMPLIED 
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE OWNERS OF THE FEE TITLE OF 
THE LAND OVER WHICH IT PASSES, AND (B) DRY HOL-
LOW ROAD WAS DEDICATED TO PUBLIC USE BY A 
RECORDED PUBLIC DOCUMENT EXECUTED BY THE 
SCHOOL BOARD OF MORGAN COUNTY, UTAH. 
The record in this case clearly indicates that for 
over sixty years Dry Hollow Road was used at will by 
hunters, sheep herders, fence builders, farmers and the 
general public. This use was with the knowledge of the 
owners of the land over which it passed and without 
objection on their part (see Statement of Facts). 
(A) Section 27-12-89, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, as amended states as follows: 
"A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 
The Utah Supreme Court has had many occasions 
to construe the above cited statute or its predecessors 
which were worded identically. In an early Utah case 
reported in 16 UT AH 240; 51 P. 980, Whitaker vs. 
Ferguson, the Court defined a "thoroughfare" and the 
conditions under which it became public. The Court said: 
7 
". . . A thoroughfare is a place or way through 
which there is passing or travel. It becomes a 
'public thoroughfare' when the public has a gen. 
eral right of passage. Under this statute the high. 
way, even though it be over privately owned 
ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned 
to the public use when the public has continu. 
ously used it as a thoroughfare for a period of 
ten years . . . " 
In the case of Clark vs. Erekson, 9 UTAH 2nd 212; 341, 
P. 2nd 424, <July, 1959) the Court stated: 
"There was testimony by witnesses, some of 
whom could remember back to 1890, that Erek· 
son Lane had been used by the general public, 
either walking or riding in wagons and later in i 
automobiles. The road was being constantly used 1 
by people either to go to church or to fish in 
Little Cottonwood Creek through which the lane 
passed, or as a short cut north between 59th South 1 
and Vine Street. There was no evidence that per· i 
mission was sought or given by anyone to use i 
this short cut. . . . This evidence is sufficient to , 
establish a dedication of the road by user under [ 
the provisions of Section 27-1-2, UTAH CODE: 
ANNOTATED, 1953, the evidence being uncon· i 
tradicted that Erekson Lane was being used as a ' 
highway by the public generally for more than i 
ten years." 1 
In another early case, Schettler vs. Lynch, 23 UTAH 
305; 64 P. 955, the Court held that "land having been i 
once dedicated by the owners of the soil as a highway, : 
and having been accepted by the public, all subsequent : 
grantees of the abutting lands are bound by such dedi- [ 
cation, and have no right to obstruct any portion of the i 
street." 
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(B) On February 9, 1917, (after Dry Hollow Road 
had been used by the public for over twenty years) re-
spondent's predecessors in interest conveyed Dry Hollow 
Road to the Board of Education of Morgan County, Utah. 
(See exh. 1). In the year 1920 the Board of Education, 
which is a body politic of the State of Utah, constructed 
a road over the Dry Hollow Thoroughfare. (T:) In 1937, 
some twenty years after its purchase of the Dry Hollow 
l 1 Road and some seventeen years after the construction 
work done on the road, the Board of Education deeded 
the road to the Peterson Corporation of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. We repeat part of the 
wording in this deed for the convenience of the Court: 





















That the property described herein be permanently main-
tained intact and used for public benefit and to remain 
non-transferable in part or whole to private enterprise 
and that a reasonable effort be made by the grantee to 
maintain and use the property for the best interest of 
the community." (Exh. 2, 11, 12). 
After the dedication contained m this deed, Dry 
Hollow Road was used for various purposes by the gen-
eral public without objection on the part of the owners 
of the fee (see Statement of Facts). In July of 1964 (some 
27 years after the dedication to public use above cited), 
respondent paid the school board the sum of $10 for a 
quit-claim deed, in favor of respondent, quit-claiming, 
among other things, the right-of-way represented by Dry 
Hollow Road. Section 27-12-90 (formerly 27-1-3) UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, as amended, states as fol-
lows: 
9 
"All highways, once established, must con. 
tinue to be highways until abandoned by order of 
the Board of County Commissioners of the county ' 
in which they are situated, or other competent 
authority." 
Thus Dry Hollow Road by use and by acquiescence of 
the owners of the fee, has been dedicated to public use . 
by implication for a period of over sixty years. Further. · 
more, it has specifically been dedicated to public use by 
a recorded deed executed by a public body for a period : 
of some thirty years. An attempt to void this public ded. ! 
ication by quit-claim deed is nullity. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON 
THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CLAIM TO A 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT TO THE ROAD IN QUESTION 
AS ALLEGED IN HER COMPLAINT AND AS SHOWN BY 
HER EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
The Court's attention is called to paragraphs 2 and 
4 of the prayer of plaintiff's complaint in which the plain· 
tiff-appellant asks the Court to declare that the plaintiff 
"has the right to use the aforesaid right-of-way for ingress 
and egress to the above described property," and "for an 
order of the Court enjoining and restraining the defend· 
ant from interfering with plaintiff's use of said right-of· 
way in obtaining ingress and egress from said real 
property." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case 











1127, determined that "the right by prescription can only 
arise by adverse use and enjoyment under claim of right 
uninterrupted and continuous for a period of 20 years." 
This case established the basic prescriptive period 
for obtaining a right-of-way by adverse use in the State 
of Utah and the Court goes on to say: "Under the well-
established rule, the use, in order that it may ripen into 
a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be adverse 
and continuous, and under claim of right for a period 
of twenty years, but it must be uninterrupted throughout 
that period." 
Applying the ruling of the Court to the facts in the 
instant case, the Court's attention is called to the fact 
that the record clearly discloses that the plaintiff-appel-
lant and her predecessors in interest used the highway 
or thoroughfare through the property of the defendant-
respondent uninterruptedly for more than twenty years 
under a claim of right, which was based on the facts 
that there had been a written public dedication of the 
highway or thoroughfare in question on which the plain-
tiff and her predecessors in interest had relied and, fur-
thermore, the record discloses that plaintiff-appellant and 
her predecessors in interest all took the position that this 
was a public thoroughfare dedicated by reason of the 
general use of the public over a period of time in excess 
of sixty years and that in any event, plaintiff-appellant 
and her predecessors in interest had a right to use the 
road in question to maintain their water rights. Cer-
tainly, the record is clear that the claim to the use of 
11 
the roadway in question was based on the rights as here. 
tofore set forth and shown in the record. 
The record further indicates that the use by the 
plaintiff-appellant was uninterrupted throughout the 
prescriptive period of twenty years. There is evidence 
that a fence and a gate was erected but that the plaintiff. 
appellant's predecessor in interest was given a key to 
the lock on the gate so that at no time was the plaintiff .. 
appellant or her predecessor in interest denied the right 
to the use of the road in question. The Court's attention 
is further called to the fact that the present fence and , 
gate, which the defendant-respondent locked in 1964, I 
and which precipitated this lawsuit, was not erected by 
the defendant-respondent but rather was placed there 
by the State Highway Department to protect the state 
highway right-of-way and prevent livestock from enter· 
ing thereon from the private property adjacent to the 
freeway right-of-way. 
On the basis of the law and the facts in the record, 
the plaintiff-appellant had acquired a prescriptive right 
to the use of the property of the defendant-respondent 
for the limited purpose of ingress and egress from the 
state highway to her property. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING FROM THE 
FACTS IN THE RECORD THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
HAD ACQUIRED A RIGHT-OF-WAY THROUGH DEFEND· 
ANT-RESPONDENT'S LAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
MAINTAINING HER WATER RIGHT, PURSUANT TO 
12 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-1-15, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED. 
The Legislature of this state many years ago realized 
that water and proper access to the water at its point of 
diversion created many feuding "Martin and McCoy" sit-
uations and therefore wisely enacted Section 73-1-15 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 195 3, as amended, im-
posing criminal penalties for a violation of a person's 
right-of-way to maintain his rights to properly care for 
his water along the water course up to the point of diver-
sion. Said section reads as follows: 
"Obstructing ditches or right-of-way - Pen-
alty. - Whenever any person has a right-of-way 
for any canal or other water course it shall be 
unlawful for any person to place or maintain in 
place any obstruction, by fence or otherwise, along 
or across such canal or water course, without pro-
viding gates sufficient for the passage of the owner 
of such canal or water course. Any person vio-
lating the provisions of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor." 
The record, as hereofore reiterated to this Court in 
the Statement of Facts, clearly shows that plaintiff-appel-
lant and her predecessors in interest had a water right 
in the Bohman Springs and that pursuant to this right 
she and her predecessors in interest had continuously, 
for over twenty years, used the road in question for the 
purpose of maintaining the water right and the water 
course and that at no time prior to 1964 when the de-
fendant-respondent placed a lock on the state highway 
right-of-way gate was the plaintiff-appellant and her 






road in question for the purpose of maintaining the ! 
water course of the water to which they were entitled [ 
I 
to use out of the Bohman Springs. 
While there is no evidence in the record that plain-
tiff-appellant has invoked the provisions of said Section I 
I 
73-1-15, this Court can take judicial notice of the laws , 
of the State of Utah as could the lower court and can ! 
therefore rule that plaintiff-appellant is entitled under 
the laws of this state to the protection of her rights as 
set forth in the above quoted section of our code. 
CONCLUSION 
While the law hesitates placing a burden upon pri· 
vate property, either for a public use or a private use, 
the law does clearly recognize both by statute and case 
law that such rights can be acquired. The courts of this 
state have indicated that where a thoroughfore has been 
used continuously and openly by the general public for 
a long period of time, sixty years or more, there arises 
a strong presumption that such thoroughfare has been 
dedicated by public use. Particularly is this true where 
there has been a written public dedication and acquies· 
cence over a long period of time by the owner of the 
land over which the road in question runs and thereby 
people have relied upon such facts and have used the i 
roadway openly, notoriously and with a claim of right 1 
over such period of time. 
Furthermore, a private individual can acquire a pre· 




























under claim of right adverse to the rights of the owner 
of the land over which the roadway in question runs 
and plaintiff-appellant respectfully submits that the rec-
ord clearly shows that she and her predecessors in interest 
have acquired such a prescriptive right and the court 
below should have ruled on this issue. In any event, 
the plaintiff-appellant under the law has a right to main-
tain the water course in the water right which she has 
in the Bohman Springs and therefore is entitled to the 
relief prayed for in her complaint under the provisions 
of Section 73-1-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
as amended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. and 
LEON A. HALGREN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
1346 Laird A venue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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